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Article 7

ADOPTING COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE: SOME
THOUGHTS FOR THE LATE REFORMER
KENNETH

S.

ABRAHAM*

During the last decade comparative negligence became the law in
the vast majority of American jurisdictions.' The swiftness of this
change is almost unparalleled in the history of American tort law. 2
That this action was taken by different branches of government in different states is itself remarkable, signalling as it does the unsettled character of our ideas about the proper scope of judicial law-making
authority.3 The backing and filling that is necessary to construct a fully
developed body of doctrine is now proceeding. Yet, as Edward Digges
and Robert Dale Klein have noted in this issue,4 Maryland remains
one of the few jurisdictions still in the contributory negligence camp. 5
It would be easy to interpret this stance as stubborn unwillingness
by the Maryland General Assembly to adopt an almost universally
praised reform, as the triumph of interest group politics over considerations of principle, 6 or as an ultra-conservative refusal by the courts of
Maryland to overturn a legal doctrine created by the courts in the first
place.7 These factors may well explain the continuing reign of contributory negligence in this state, as may others. But explanation is not
justification. Wise reform often occurs for the worst of reasons, and illadvised changes are sometimes made for the best of motives. The
*

Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

1. Thirty-eight states now operate under some form of comparative negligence. See
Digges & Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland: The Time Has Come, 41 MD. L. REV. 276,
277 (1982). Thirty-one have adopted the doctrine since 1969. See id. at 280 nn.30 & 35.
2. The only other development in tort law that seems to have occurred this swiftly is
the rise of strict liability for injuries caused by defective products. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 657-58 (4th ed. 1971).
3. The literature on the general issue is voluminous. For examples of three different
sorts of analysis, see generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept- Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467
(1976); Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative vs. Contributory Negligence: Should the
Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1968).

4. Digges & Klein, supra note 1, at 277.
5. The others are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and the District of Columbia. See id.
at 277 n.6.
6. Insurance companies and their lobbyists typically oppose the adoption of comparative negligence.
7. Maryland adopted contributory negligence in Irwin v. Sprigg, 6 Gill 200 (Md. 1847).
See Digges & Klein, supra note 1, at 278 n.19.
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proper question for the legal analyst is not simply, "Why is the law as it

is?", but also "Should the law be as it is?" The need to assess the justifications for contributory and comparative negligence therefore remains paramount, regardless of the explanation for the present state of
Maryland law.
The context in which the issue arises is a special one. Thirty-eight
states now have experience with comparative negligence. The decision
whether to adopt the doctrine need no longer be exclusively analytical
and abstract. In addition, background legal and economic considerations have changed enough since the debate about comparative negligence began in earnest that the balance between the costs and benefits
of adoption may differ from what it was a decade or more ago.
In short, the issue facing decision-makers today is not the same
issue that faced the comparative negligence pioneers. In what follows,
therefore, I shall try to canvass some of the considerations that make
the issue different today. I make no pretense of discussing all the issues
that bear on the ultimate question whether to adopt comparative negligence; these have been ably analyzed by many of the commentators on
whom Digges and Klein have relied.' But because Maryland faces this
question toward the end of a cycle of reform, it may be worthwhile to
attend to those factors that add a new dimension to the question now
facing Maryland. In doing so, we may also gain some insights into the
differences between legal reform that blazes a new path and reform by
jurisdictions that decide to follow along behind.
Finally, I should add that I am not opposed to the adoption of
comparative negligence. But it would be a sad commentary if Maryland, after a decade of inaction, were to adopt comparative negligence
only for reasons that would have justified such action long ago. In
reevaluating its position, a jurisdiction that has lagged behind should
consider not only those arguments that have been recognized from the
outset, but also the new developments that will help it find its way.
I.

THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER STATES

One of the supposed geniuses of the federal system is that it
authorizes fifty local experiments in law and governance. Those experiments which succeed may then be more widely adopted, and the failures may be discarded. This theory suggests, then, that the way to
begin evaluating the comparative negligence doctrine is by looking at
the experiences of the states now experimenting with the doctrine. An
apparently good theory, however, often fails to work in practice. In
8, See Digges & Klein, supra note 1, at 282 n.32.
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this case, there is almost no information about the effects of adopting
the doctrine, and what information there is explains little. Maryland
will have to face the issue and make its decision without comprehensive
data to inform it.
Some of the available information is based on surveys of lawyers'
and judges' impressions. It is very out of date and statistically insignificant. The impressions, for what they are worth, were that the adoption
of comparative negligence somewhat increased the number of claims,
number of settlements, and percentage of successful claims, but that the
doctrine had no other significant effect on litigation.9 Other studies attempted to compare statistics from comparative negligence states with
those from similar states that had not adopted the doctrine, but these
studies yielded inconclusive results.' ° Even Wisconsin and Minnesota,
or Kansas and Nebraska, it seems, are too different to be reliably compared. One observer who studied a single insurance company's closed
claim files discovered no noticeable difference in the treatment of
claims from comparative and contributory negligence states."l
Why is there so little data? First, many states have only recently
adopted comparative negligence. It takes time for accidents to occur,
suits to be filed, and data concerning settlements and the characteristics
of trials and appeals to accumulate. Second, to acquire the kind of data
that would be useful, retrospective study would probably be inadequate. The information that would be helpful - the average length
and complexity of trials before and after the adoption of comparative
negligence, just to give two examples - is very difficult to retrieve after-the-fact. Someone has to decide in advance to follow developments
longitudinally. And even if only the period after enactment were to be
studied, data collection would have to be planned prospectively, because court systems often do not systematically maintain data in ways
that would be helpful. This is expensive and time-consuming. Moreover, there have been so many other changes in the past decade economic, demographic and legal - that it would be very difficult to
isolate the effect of only one of these many changes on the characteristics of negligence claims. Perhaps this does not entirely explain why
there is no data at all on recent experience, but it does tend to suggest
that we should expect very little.
9. See generally Rosenberg, ComparativeNegligence in Arkansas. A "Before andAfter"
Survey, 13 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1959); Note, Comparative Negligence -A Survey ofthe Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REV. 692 (1969).
10. See, e.g., Peck, Comparative Negligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58
MICH. L. REV. 689 (1960).
11. See H. Ross, SETrLED OUT OF COURT 211 (2d ed. 1980).
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Nevertheless, some inferences can be drawn even from the absence
of evidence. Insurance companies typically oppose the enactment of
comparative negligence. Their intuition that the doctrine will result in
greater payouts or increased defense costs should lead them to request
insurance commissioners to authorize premium increases in jurisdictions adopting the doctrine. There is almost no evidence that insurance
companies have been able to support these requests with statistical
proof.' 2 Yet they have greater access to data than any other party to
the controversy. Whatever the other effects of comparative negligence,
then, it has not demonstrably increased the total cost of operating the
negligence system. On the other hand, no one yet has been able to
show that the doctrine has the opposite effect. There is no proof that
there has been a cost saving in any of the states that have adopted comparative negligence. One of two conclusions might be drawn here. The
first is that the doctrine has produced positive or negative effects, but
that they have been difficult to isolate and measure. The alternative is
to conclude that adopting comparative negligence does not have a significant impact on the cost of operating the negligence system. The
latter explanation seems the more probable.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that comparative negligence has no effect. Its adoption may rearrange the way compensation
is distributed, as those who favor the doctrine intend. For example,
mote plaintiffs might receive a lower average payment under comparative negligence. Trials also might be more complex and costly because
of the need to focus on the comparative fault of plaintiff and defendant,
but fewer trials might be held because of increased settlements. There
could be other effects as well. It is unfortunate that Maryland decisionmakers will not have access to studies that would help them predict the
shape of the changes that would flow from adopting the doctrine. But
information of this sort may never be available in reliable form. A
decision to adopt or not to adopt will therefore have to be made without such information, except for the assurance that comparative negligence reform probably will not have a significant statistical impact on
the overall cost of operating the negligence system.
II.

LEGISLATURE OR COURT?

Seven state courts have made comparative negligence the law in
12. The only exception seems to have occurred in New York. Letter from Mr. Michael
Waiters, Vice President, Insurance Services Office, to Mr. William Martin, Vice President
and General Counsel, American Insurance Association (Sept. 26, 1977) (survey of closed

California claims suggests there will be a 5% effect in New York after the enactment of
comparative negligence) (on file with the MarylandLaw Review).
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their jurisdictions.' 3 The remaining thirty-one comparative negligence
states adopted the doctrine through legislative action.' 4 There is no
dispute that the latter approach is appropriate, although some of course
dispute the wisdom of the doctrine. There is considerable disagreement, however, about the propriety of judicial adoption of comparative
negligence.
The states that have retained contributory negligence have a special purchase from which to view this issue. The argument that adopting a comparative negligence rule is beyond the province of the courts
has always had a hollow ring to it. Contributory negligence, after all, is
a court-created doctrine; the courts would seem not to be automatically
precluded from modifying what they have created. And the reasons
often given for abolishing contributory negligence - its unfairness in
penalizing plaintiffs for very small amounts of carelessness' 5 and the
case-to-case inconsistencies that result from relying on a rule that conflicts with the jury's intuitive notions of fairness' 6 - are characteristically the kinds of arguments that courts consider in fashioning legal
doctrine.
Furthermore, at this point in the development of comparative negligence, a court considering the doctrine has more than theory to inform it. The argument against judicial adoption is ultimately that it
would be antidemocratic - that so fundamental a decision about civil
liability should be made by a representative branch of governfrient.
Yet never has a judicial decision to adopt comparative negligence been
legislatively overturned - even in those states whose legislatures, had
considered, but had not enacted comparative negligence prior to judicial adoption of the doctrine."' That legislatures in these states did not
overrule this judicial action obviously does not prove anything about
the desires of the people of Maryland or their representatives. But it
does suggest that concern about legislative prerogatives can be overemphasized. Legislatures are often happier when problems just go away,
and judicial resolution of a problem is one way to make it go away.
Little but a whisper was heard from the Maryland General Assembly,
13. See Digges & Klein, supra note 1, at 279 n.28.
14. See id. at 279 n.29.
15. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 67 at 433; 2 F.

HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF

TORTS 1207 (1956).

16. Keeton, Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative vs. Contributory"
Should the Court or Legislature Decide?. 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 916 (1968).
17. The states are Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico and West
Virginia. For summaries of the rules adopted in these states, and of the comparative negligence statutes enacted in the remaining thirty-one states operating under the doctrine, see H.
WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT 421-595 (1978 & Supp. 1980).
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for example, when the Court of Appeals overturned another longstanding common law rule by imposing strict liability on manufacturers of defective products.' 8
Finally, it is sometimes said that although the decision to adopt
comparative negligence resembles the kind of choices typically made
by courts, the subsidiary issues that must be faced in implementing a
comparative negligence system are characteristically legislative.' 9 For
example, if courts adopt comparative negligence, they also will have to
decide how to treat the problems of joinder and set-off and the role of
such doctrines as assumption of risk and last clear chance.20 Put this all
together, the argument goes, and it amounts to a wide-ranging tort reform statute enacted by a court.
The weakness of this argument is twofold. First, much of the law
regarding these problems is judge-made. The courts have the authority
and the competence to modify it. 2' And no court would have to announce in a declaratory judgment its resolution of all these issues. At
least some of these problems could be resolved on a case-by-case basis,
in the way that courts usually make decisions. Second, and more important, the typical comparative negligence statute deals with few of
18. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). Bills dealing with products liability were introduced in each house in subsequent sessions. None was
enacted. See S.B. 813 (1981) (prohibiting products liability actions against sellers of defective products sold in sealed containers, with exceptions); H.B. 1128 (1981) (establishing presumption that an injury was not caused by a defective product if more than 10 years had
elapsed between purchase and injury; setting standard of proof; providing affirmative defenses for sellers of defective products under certain circumstances and with certain exceptions); H.B. 1317 (1981) (providing affirmative defenses for sellers of defective products sold
in sealed containers under certain circumstances and with certain exceptions); S.B. 495
(1980) (defining and prohibiting product liability actions against sellers of defective products
sold in sealed containers with certain exceptions); S.J. Res. 23 (1980) (proposing the appointment of a commission to study Maryland product liability law); H.J. Res. 27 (1980) (reintroducing H.J. Res. 27 (1978) which proposed the appointment of a Product Liability Insurance
Commission); H.B. 1568 (1979) (defining product liability cause of action, standard of care,
limitations period and defenses); S.B. 1203 (1978) (outlining standard of reasonable care in
manufacturing, design, and consumer use; defining limitations period and defenses); H.J.
Res. 27 (1978) (proposing the appointment of a Product Liability Insurance Commission to
study the impact of product liability on manufacturers and to recommend legislative
changes); S.B. 988 (1977) (defining product liability cause of action, limitations period, and
defenses).
19. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 355 (1974); Kalven, Comment,
Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative vs. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or
Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 897, 899-900 (1968).
20. See Leflar, Comment, Comments on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative vs. Contributory
Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 918, 920-21 (1968).
21. See generally Phillips, The Casefor JudicialAdoption of Comparative Fault in South
Carolina, 32 S.C.L. REV. 295 (1980).
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these issues.2 2 The argument that the courts should defer to legislatures
on such matters thus has no practical significance. Even in states whose
legislatures have mandated comparative negligence the courts have had
to develop detailed frameworks for implementing the doctrine and
resolving the issues that arise after its adoption.
In sum, the proper allocation of authority between legislatures and
courts on this question is not crystal clear. Some of the issues that must
be resolved in deciding whether to adopt comparative negligence are
characteristically judicial issues. Others are less typically the kind that
can be easily resolved by a court, but seem to have been left for judicial
resolution even in the states that have enacted comparative negligence
legislation. Unlike judicial resolution of constitutional questions, a
court's decision to adopt comparative negligence can be overturned or
modified by the legislature. Thus, any threat to popular government
from judicial adoption of comparative negligence can be remedied easily. Yet in none of the seven states whose courts have adopted comparative negligence has the legislature overturned that judicial decision.
In each case, rather, legislatures have acquiesced in the adoption of the
doctrine.2 3 Although there are arguments against the existence of judicial authority to adopt this doctrine, then, such action certainly is not
obviously inappropriate. If anything, the balance seems to lie on the
side of judicial authority to adopt comparative negligence.
III.

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AS REPAIR OF THE
NEGLIGENCE SYSTEM

The absence of evidence that comparative negligence has produced positive effects in the states that have adopted it and disagreement regarding the proper branch of government to make any change
are both obstacles to reform in this field. Even after hurdling these
obstacles, however, the proponents of comparative negligence ought to
consider an argument that strikes at the central purpose of comparative
negligence reform. The argument is that comparative negligence
merely attempts to repair a system that is fraught with inefficiency and
unfairness. We are now moving away from a system in which the right
to compensation turns on whether the injuring party was at fault.
There is, for instance, a clear movement away from reliance on recov22. The statutes of only six states deal with any of these issues. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN § 52-572h (West 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 12 (West 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.475 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4.1
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -38 (1977). None deals with all these issues. Some
of the other statutes deal with others. See H. WOODS, supra note 17.
23. See supra note 17.
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ery in tort and toward first-party insurance compensation systems for
accident victims. Comparative negligence may run counter to this
trend, and could impede it.
Ultimately, I believe, this argument fails. It is a straw man that I
shall set up only to knock down. Nevertheless, it presents a serious
problem, because it calls on the reformer to locate his proposal for the
adoption of comparative negligence within a larger context - the
changes that are occurring in the way tort and compensation systems
provide recompense for accidental injury.
In analyzing this argument we need not rehearse the criticisms that
have been levelled at the negligence system, 24 nor explore the classic
choice between reform through a series of small improvements and deliberate tolerance of the mounting inadequacies in a legal regime in
order to promote its complete abolition. The considerations that bear
on these problems are very much the same as they were over a decade
ago, when the wholesale adoption of comparative negligence began.
But the spread of compensation devices that parallel, and in some cases
replace the negligence system is new. Their significance for the decision whether to adopt comparative negligence deserves consideration.
Ten years ago debate raged over the value of retaining the negligence system. As so often happens, that debate was not settled in allor-nothing fashion. A slow accretion of reforms, some direct and some
indirect, have begun a limited but distinct trend away from heavy reliance on the negligence system, in this jurisdiction and in others. In the
past -en years there has been a quiet but very extensive increase in the
amount and scope of insurance coverage protecting the citizens of Maryland. For example, Blue-Cross, Blue Shield, and other forms of private health care coverage are more widespread and provide greater
coverage than ever before. Governmentally provided coverage, such as
medicare and medicaid, has also increased. All told, approximately
eighty-two percent of the people of Maryland have some such health
insurance.25 In addition, homeowners' and most tenants' insurance
policies include medical coverage protecting visitors and non-residents
injured on the premises. The owner of every motor vehicle registered
in Maryland must purchase "personal injury protection," covering
medical expenses and lost income, for himself, members of his household, passengers, those driving the vehicle with permission, and pedes24. A good discussion is Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and
Selectiv'e Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967).
25. I have calculated the figure based on data in HEALTH INS. INST., SOURCE BOOK OF
HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 18-19, 41 (1979-1980).
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trians injured in accidents involving the vehicle.26 Insurance
companies also must offer collision coverage to every insured, although
there is no requirement that anyone purchase it.27 None of these developments, statutory or market-based, precludes recovery in tort for the
injuries against which they provide protection,28 although duplicate recovery is sometimes prohibited.29 But the effect of each is to decrease a
potential tort plaintiff's incentive to bring suit, by providing a relatively
simple and expeditious means of recovering at least some, and sometimes all of his out-of-pocket expenses, without regard to fault.30
This emerging statutory and economic framework provides a potential alternative to the fault system for recovering out-of-pocket damages. This framework of insurance protections has not been planned
exclusively for this purpose. Indeed, the extent to which planning has
affected the growth of any component is debatable. And full coverage
is not yet in place. But what started out as a few small pockets of firstparty coverage has grown to the point that, aside from pain and suffering, a sizeable portion of the losses that are recoverable in tort are also
reimbursable from another source. In short, though this growth has
occurred in somewhat haphazard and unsystematic fashion, we have a
regime of increasingly widespread accident insurance.
A negligence system is often thought to be the very antithesis of
such a regime, especially if it incorporates the contributory negligence
doctrine. In one sense, this view is accurate. First-party accident insurance disregards fault and the deterrence of faulty behavior in favor of
swift and certain compensation for accident victims. It focuses on the
victim's injuries, not on the conduct of the victim and the party injuring
him. The negligence system, on the other hand, is conduct-oriented. In
a traditional negligence system, the plaintiff may recover only if he is
totally without blame for his injury and can prove that the defendant
was negligent in causing it. In contrast, a comparative negligence system arguably is more compensation-oriented. Although it still makes
conduct, rather than injury and compensation, the focus of decision, in
26. MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1979). The minimum coverage required is $2500
per person.
27. Id. § 541(d).
28. Insurers paying benefits under coverage issued pursuant to § 539 have no rights of
subrogation to recover these benefits from any third party. Id. § 540.
29. See id. § 543.
30. The incentive to sue is further weakened by the relation between the subrogation
rights of the claimant's insurers and his potential tort recovery. If the claimant does bring
suit, the collateral source rule admittedly allows him to recover damages from the defendant
even for expenses already paid by the claimant's own insurers. But in many instances the
claimant's insurers will then have contract rights to reimbursement for such payments out of
the claimant's tort recovery. R. KEETON, BASIC TExT ON INSURANCE LAW 159-60 (1970).
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pure comparative negligence plaintiffs are almost never totally foreclosed from recovering compensation." They receive at least a portion
of their losses. Under this view, the contributory negligence approach
is the furthest removed from a system of first-party, non-fault based
accident insurance. Because comparative negligence relaxes the rigidity of the all-or-nothing approach and allows more plaintiffs to recover,
it achieves more of the aims of accident insurance.
An entirely different view, however, would see comparative negligence as the servant of the negligence system and contributory negligence as producing results more consistent with the movement toward
a no-fault accident compensation system. This may not be what the
defenders of contributory negligence normally have in mind, but the
relation may exist nonetheless.
The contributory negligence doctrine discourages some tort claims
and may encourage settlement of others that are made, because it holds
out the possibility that the plaintiff will be denied recovery even when
the defendant was negligent. 2 But this is not to say that the plaintiff
receives no compensation from other sources. With the spread of various forms of accident insurance, the plaintiff is increasingly likely to
receive (or already has received) compensation for his out-of-pocket
losses anyway. To the extent that this is the case, negligence litigation
becomes mainly a contest over pain and suffering damages. 33 The effect of the contributory negligence doctrine in such a context is not to
deny the plaintiff compensation; it is to deny him general damages for
pain .and suffering from the defendant.
Yet this is exactly what a system of no-fault accident insurance
that replaced the negligence system would do also - provide compensation for out-of-pocket losses, but not for pain and suffering. The nofault approach would forego awarding pain and suffering damages to
tort claimants in order to finance smaller awards to a much larger
31. In "modified" comparative negligence, the plaintiff is only entitled to recover if his
negligence is "not as great as" or "not greater than" the defendant's. See Digges & Klein,
supra note 1, at 281-82.
32. Data from the University of Chicago jury study showed that in trials where contributory negligence was an issue, the jury found for the defendant in 46% of the cases. Where
contributory negligence was not an issue, the figure dropped to 22%. SeeKalven, supra note
19, at 903. Comparative negligence, however, may promote increased settlement of certain
kinds of claims. See Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 91; Note, supra note 9, at 702. But see H.
Ross, supra note 11, at 123-35 (because juries reach compromise verdicts where plaintiffs
were contributorily negligent, claims adjustors take this into account in evaluating claims).
33. This is especially true when the plaintiff is denied double recovery of his out-ofpocket expenses because of his own insurer's right to reimbursement out of any ultimate tort
recovery. See supra note 30.
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group of accident victims. 3 4 The contributory negligence system strikes

a compromise; it leaves those plaintiffs who are partially to blame for
their injuries to seek compensation from accident insurance sources. It
allows compensation for pain and suffering only to plaintiffs without
fault whose claim to general damages is also significant enough to warrant their attempting to overcome the economic35 and legal obstacles to
recovery. In this sense, the contributory negligence doctrine acts as a
gatekeeper for the tort system, permitting only selected claims to pass
into it, and channelling the remainder into an increasingly important
system of first-party insurance that rarely requires litigation as a prerequisite to recovery.
This accident insurance perspective provides an argument for retaining contributory negligence, but the argument has two weaknesses.
First, the practical differences between the operation of contributory
and comparative negligence are probably marginal. Comparative negligence may encourage reliance on the tort system, because it relaxes
the restriction on plaintiffs' recoveries, entitling every plaintiff to at
least some of the pain and suffering damages that are often the principal reason for bringing suit in the first place.36 On occasion trials in
comparative negligence jurisdictions may even be more costly, because
of the difficulty of comparing plaintiff's and defendant's negligence
rather than simply determining whether each party was at fault. Yet
the number of claims processed by the tort system probably is not
much greater under comparative negligence. Although contributory
negligence perhaps helps to minimize the number of claims that are
resolved within the tort system, many accident victims file suit despite
the possibility of being found contributorily negligent. Given the
nearly universal admission that juries in contributory negligence jurisdictions apply a rough comparative negligence standard,37 and given
that most contributory negligence questions are submitted to the jury,
retaining contributory negligence simply to encourage marginally
34. For analysis of the many different forms of no-fault systems, see J.

O'CONNELL

& R.

HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND (1975). Of course, such systems would

not necessarily abolish all negligence claims, or totally preclude payment for pain and
suffering.
35. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 28 (1964); Franklin,
Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study ofthe Economics of PersonalInjury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1961); Reder, ContingentFees in Litigation with Special
Re/erence to Medical Malfpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 211 (S.

Rottenberg 1978).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
37. See, e.g., H. Ross, supra note 11, at 123-25 (belief by claims adjusters that compromise verdicts regularly occur).
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greater reliance on first-party insurance does not seem warranted.38
Adopting comparative negligence would change few but the unusual
cases in which a claims adjuster or jury strictly and stubbornly follows
the law. Adoption, however, would make more controllable what now
is hidden and thus help assure that similar cases are treated similarly. 9
The second weakness in the argument favoring contributory negligence is that it too quickly suggests that negligence litigation is mainly
a contest over pain and suffering damages. We have not yet reached
the point at which this is true. First-party insurance is widespread; but
it is not universal. And there are gaps and limitations in coverage, especially coverage against lost income. First, insurance against wageloss is not so widespread as insurance against health care costs. Even
some relatively small losses may not be fully compensated because of
this gap. Second, relatively large losses are unlikely to be fully covered,
because generally neither health insurance, which usually is available,
nor wage-loss insurance, which often is not, fully cover catastrophic
losses.
Nevertheless, because of the nuisance value of small claims, those
with small losses often recover far more than their out-of-pocket losses
in tort - their claims do tend to be contests over general damages.
Because first-party~insurance coverage is not universal, however, and
because liability insurers have a strong incentive to contest large
claims, tort claimants with sizeable losses tend not to recover even their
full out-of-pocket expenses at present. 4 ' Thus, a move to comparative
38. If contributory negligence were retained for this reason, the doctrine might even
have to be strengthened by reducing the heavy allocation of discretion to juries in this area,
and ruling more conduct contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Such an approach has
classic, if not venerable roots. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927);
Lorenzo v. Wirth, 170 Mass. 596, 49 N.E. 1010 (1898); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
98-99 (M. Howe ed. 1963); Malone, The Formative Eraof ContributoryNegligence, 41 ILL. L.
REV. 151 (1946). Recent decisions of the Maryland courts relaxing the harsh effect of the socalled "boulevard rule" would then take on a different cast. See, e.g., Covington v. Gernert,
280 Md. 322, 373 A.2d 624 (1977); Dean v. Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977);
Hansen v. Kaplan, 47 Md. App. 32, 421 A.2d 113 (1980); Gazvoda v. McCaslin, 36 Md. App.
604, 375 A.2d 570 (1977).
39. See Keeton, supra note 16, at 916.
40. Comprehensive Maryland data is not available. Though a very high percentage of
wage earners have the limited lost income protection available through workers' compensation and social security, a much smaller percentage has private disability insurance. Nationally, for example, less than twenty million people in 1979 had disability coverage that
provided protection for more than two years disability. See SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA, supra note 25 at 20.
41. For example, in the most systematic study of automobile accident victims to date,
those tort claimants with economic losses greater than $10,000 recovered less than half of
those losses in tort, whereas those with economic losses less than $1000 recovered more than
twice their actual economic losses in tort. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ECONOMIC CONSE-
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negligence conceivably could encourage those small claimants who
now are content to receive only first-party insurance compensation to
seek pain and suffering recoveries in tort. But retaining contributory
negligence could more significantly effect those with large claims. The
doctrine may not only inhibit to some extent the recovery of pain and
suffering damages by large claimants; it may also contribute to the difficulty these claimants encounter in recovering their full out-of-pocket
losses.
Of course, the possibility that adopting comparative negligence
would increase the number of claimants entitled to pain and suffering
recoveries might be attacked on principled rather than practical
grounds. Where the plaintiff is innocent and the defendant blameworthy, there is a strong argument that the former should not be denied his
full losses. But where the plaintiff is also blameworthy, according to
this view, his claim to compensation for intangible losses should be
much weaker. 42 The problem with this attack, however, is that defendants are almost always insured-against liability. The moral quality of
their conduct therefore seems indirectly relevant at most.
In fact the moral inequity, if there is any in comparative negligence, lies in the disparity it creates among potential plaintiffs. The
dilemma that now faces all of tort law concerns the choice between
those who are entitled to full tort damages and those who are left to
systems that pay out-of-pocket losses only. 43 Victims of automobile ac-

cidents or dangerous products can often recover in tort; victims of falls
in bathtubs usually cannot. Contributory negligence reduces some of
the tension arising from this differential treatment by limiting the right
to recover tort damages to innocent claimants. Comparative negligence
would exacerbate the tension. Even negligent victims of automobile or
product accidents would be entitled to some tort damages; yet innocent
victims of many household accidents would receive only out-of-pocket
damages, if that. From the standpoint of the injured party, the causal
role of the defendant in the cases where there is tort recovery will often
seem insufficient to justify this difference in treatment.' This is especially true where most defendants are insured, and diffuse deterrence is
QUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJURIES 47 (1970). Both figures are net of legal costs,
which averaged 25% of gross tort recoveries. Id. at 48. When non-tort sources were added
in, large claimants still recovered less than 70% of their economic losses. Id. at 47.
42. For discussion of the effect that recent discoveries about the causes and nature of
pain should have on pain and suffering awards, see Peck, CompensationforPain. A Reappraisal in the Light f/New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355 (1974).
43. See Atiyah, No Fault Compensation: A Question That Will Not Go Away, 54 TUL. L.
REV. 271, 275-78 (1980).
44. See id. at 284.
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therefore only a secondary consequence of imposing liability. 45
These issues are significant not simply because they resurrect old
debates about no-fault and pain and suffering awards, but because they
emphasize the context within which proposals to adopt comparative
negligence should be viewed. In the final analysis, it would be much
more sensible to achieve the goals of a non-fault based system of liability by adopting such a system, rather than by holding the line against
comparative negligence and hoping that a series of ad hoc first-party
insurance devices will achieve no-fault for us. And if pain and suffer-

ing awards require regulation or modification, then they should be regulated or modified directly. Yet personal injury law as a whole is
moving away from its reliance on fault as a touchstone for compensation. It has been doing so, legislatively46 and judicially," for a long
time. The role to be played by comparative negligence in these developments must be considered if the doctrine is to function in tandem
with the rest of the law, as that law grows and changes.4 8
45. Moreover, adopting comparative negligence probably would have little effect on
those areas of negligence law where achieving deterrence through the imposition of liability
is still an important goal. The reasonableness of the plaintifi's conduct is rarely at issue in
most medical malpractice or environmental pollution cases, for example. So a move to comparative negligence would have almost no impact on the deterrent effect of tort liability in
these fields. Even in other cases, the adoption of comparative negligence is not likely to
have much effect one way or the other on the deterrence of negligent conduct. Comparative
negligence might provide some additional deterrence of negligent conduct, because some
defendants who were previously exonerated would now be found liable for a portion of the
plaintiff's damages. But there would also be a corresponding loss in deterrence, because
some plaintiffs who previously were barred from recovery would now be paid a portion of
their losses, despite their comparative negligence. Thus, even if tort liability for negligent
driving, for example, promotes careful driving, there is little reason to believe that a move
from contributory to comparative negligence would noticeably alter this effect. For an excellent analysis of the potential effects on accident prevention of various forms of contributory and comparative negligence, see Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A
Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697, 703-21 (1978).

46. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 539 (1979) (personal injury protection for victims of motor vehicle accidents); MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1979) (workmen's
compensation).
47. See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976) (strict
liability imposed for injury caused by defective products); Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co.
v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 A. 866 (1922) (res ipsa loquitur applied to exploding beverage
container).
48. For instance, comparative negligence might well undermine the purpose of certain
no-fault liability standards. Importing comparative negligence into strict products liability

is a possible example. However, because products liability embodies both a no-fault liability
standard and the right to recover pain and suffering damages, this would probably be a
sensible compromise. Digges and Klein do not rely on this rationale to explain their support
for applying comparative negligence to products liability claims, although applying the doctrine in such cases seems to be an important part of their proposal. See Digges & Klein
supra note 1, at 286-90. For those who represent defendants in products liability cases,
theirs is an understandable, though in scholarly terms perhaps not an entirely unbiased
position.
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The question, therefore, is not whether to move away from the
fault system, but what the form and extent of that move should be, and
how it should relate to the pockets of negligence liability that remain.
We may debate the trade-offs entailed in various moves. We may also
consider how to fine-tune the relationship between the insurance and
negligence systems while they exist together, as they undoubtedly will
for a considerable time to come. It is even possible that change akin to
the political reversal that recently has taken place in national politics
will occur in tort law. 4 But even this would be unlikely to set our
compensation clocks back to the year 1900. The history of personal
injury law in this state and across the country for the past eighty years
is largely the story of the progressive breakdown of negligence as a
dominant paradigm and the substitution of a series of compensation
alternatives, both within and outside the tort system.
Thus, the big picture is of a move toward no-fault of various sorts
that is likely to prove irreversible. The differences between contributory and comparative negligence may eventually be swallowed up by
this overarching development. We need not decide whether to adopt
comparative negligence exclusively by reference to this development.
Indeed, adoption of comparative negligence is probably a sensible way
to ameliorate some of the formal unfairness of negligence law while
other fundamental changes in the overall compensation system evolve.
But it would be a mistake to recommend adopting the doctrine without
recognizing that it will help repair a system that has in many ways begun to fail.
CONCLUSION

On this as on so many questions of legal reform, there is unfortunately no objective standard against which the arguments for and
against change can be assessed. Comparative negligence enjoys wide
support as a progressive means of remedying a signal unfairness in the
law of torts. Yet there is little hard evidence of its effect in the jurisdictions where it is in operation, and no consensus about which branch of
government should decide whether to adopt the doctrine. The relation
between the negligence system that the doctrine would help repair and
the spreading regime of first-party insurance also requires scrutiny. Although these are matters that cannot be authoritatively resolved,
neither can they be ignored. A reform that seems straightforward and
just at the beginning of an era later may reveal layers of complexity
49. For an argument that such a retrenchment should occur, see Henderson, Expanding
the Negligence Concept: Retreatfrom the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).
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impossible to anticipate. Perhaps the greatest burden of a jurisdiction
that comes late to reform is the necessity of grappling with such
complexity.

